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Abstract. Given a rank-1 bimatrix game (A,B), i.e., where rank(A+B) = 1, we con-
struct a suitable linear subspace of the rank-1 game space and show that this subspace
is homeomorphic to its Nash equilibrium correspondence. Using this homeomorphism,
we give the first polynomial time algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium
of a rank-1 bimatrix game. This settles an open question posed in [8,21]. In addition,
we give a novel algorithm to enumerate all the Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game and
show that a similar technique may also be applied for finding a Nash equilibrium of
any bimatrix game. This technique also proves the existence, oddness and the index
theorem of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game. Further, we extend the rank-1 home-
omorphism result to a fixed rank game space, and give a fixed point formulation on
[0, 1]k for solving a rank-k game. The homeomorphism and the fixed point formulation
are piece-wise linear and considerably simpler than the classical constructions.
1 Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory is a model to understand strategic interaction of selfish agents in
a given organization. In a finite game, there are finitely many agents, each having finitely many
strategies. For finite games, Nash [13] proved that there exists a steady state where no player
benefits by a unilateral deviation. Such a steady state is called a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Finite games with two agents are also called bimatrix games since they may be represented by
two payoff matrices (A,B), one for each agent. The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of
a bimatrix game is said to be one of the most important concrete open questions on the boundary
of P [15]. The classical Lemke-Howson (LH) algorithm [11] finds a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix
game. However, Savani and von Stengel [18] showed that it is not a polynomial time algorithm
by constructing an example, for which the LH algorithm takes an exponential number of steps.
Chen and Deng [2] showed that this problem is PPAD-complete, a complexity class introduced by
Papadimitriou [16]. They (together with Teng) [3] also showed that the computation of even a 1
nΘ(1)
-
approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete. These results suggest that a polynomial
time algorithm is unlikely.
There are some results for special cases of the bimatrix games. Lipton et al. [12] considered
games where both payoff matrices are of fixed rank k and for these games, they gave a polynomial
time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium. However, the expressive power of this restricted
class of games is limited in the sense that most zero-sum games are not contained in this class.
Kannan and Theobald [8] defined a hierarchy of bimatrix games using the rank of (A+B) and gave
a polynomial time algorithm to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium for games of a fixed
rank k. The set of rank-k games consists of all the bimatrix games with rank at most k. Clearly,
rank-0 games are the same as zero-sum games and it is known that the set of Nash equilibria of a
zero-sum game is a polyhedral set (hence, connected) and it may be computed in polynomial time
by solving a linear program (LP). Moreover, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of zero-sum
games and solving linear programs are equivalent [4].
The set of rank-1 games is the smallest extension of zero-sum games in the hierarchy, which
strictly generalizes zero-sum games. For any given constant c, Kannan and Theobald [8] also con-
struct a rank-1 game, for which the number of connected components of Nash equilibria is larger
than c. This shows that the expressive power of rank-1 games is larger than the zero-sum games.
Rank-1 games may also arise in practical situations, in particular the multiplicative games between
firms and workers in [1] are rank-1 games. A polynomial time algorithm to compute an exact Nash
equilibrium for rank-1 games is an important open problem [8,21]. Kontogiannis and Spirakis [10]
defined the notion of mutual (quasi-) concavity of a bimatrix game and for mutual (quasi-) concave
games, they provide a polynomial time (FPTAS) computation of a Nash equilibrium, however their
classification and the games of fixed rank are incomparable.
Shapley’s index theory [20] assigns a sign (also called an index) to a Nash equilibrium of a
bimatrix game and shows that the indices of the two endpoints of a Lemke-Howson path have
opposite signs. The signs of the endpoints of LH paths provide a direction and in turn a “parity
argument” that puts the Nash equilibrium problem of a bimatrix game in PPAD [16,19]. The
set of bimatrix games Ω, where the number of strategies of the first and second players are m
and n respectively, forms a R2mn Euclidean space, i.e., Ω = {(A,B) ∈ Rmn × Rmn}. Kohlberg
and Mertens [9] showed that Ω is homeomorphic to its Nash equilibrium correspondence1 EΩ =
{(A,B, x, y) ∈ R2mn+m+n | (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B)}.
This structural result has been used extensively to understand the index, degree and the sta-
bility of a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game [6,9]. Moreover, the homeomorphism result also
validates the homotopy methods devised to compute a Nash equilibrium [5,7]. The structural result
has been extended for more general game spaces [17], however, to the best of our knowledge, no
such result is known for special subspaces of the bimatrix game space. Such a result may pave a
way to device a better algorithm for the Nash equilibrium computation or to prove the hardness of
computing a Nash equilibrium, for the games in the subspace.
Our contributions. For a given rank-1 game (A,B) ∈ Rmn × Rmn, the matrix (A + B) may
be written as α ·βT , where α ∈ Rm and β ∈ Rn. Motivated by this fact, in Section 2.2, we define an
m-dimensional subspace Γ = {(A,C+α.βT ) | α ∈ Rm} of Ω, where A ∈ Rmn, C ∈ Rmn and β ∈ Rn
are fixed and analyze the structure of its Nash equilibrium correspondence EΓ . For a given bimatrix
game (A,B), the best response polytopes P and Q may be defined using the payoff matrices A and
B respectively [14] (also in Section 2.1). There is a notion of fully-labeled points of P ×Q, which
capture all the Nash equilibria of the game. Note that the polytope P is same for all the games in
Γ since the payoff matrix of the first player is fixed to A. However the payoff matrix of the second
player varies with α, hence Q is different for every game. We define a new polytope Q′ in Section
2.2, which encompasses Q for all the games in Γ . We show that the set of fully-labeled points of
P ×Q′, say N , captures all the Nash equilibria of all the games in Γ and in turn captures EΓ .
Surprisingly, N turns out to be a set of cycles and a single path on the 1-skeleton of P × Q′.
We refer to the path in N as the fully-labeled path and show that it contains at least one Nash
equilibrium of every game in Γ . The structure of N also proves the existence and the oddness of
the number of Nash equilibria in a non-degenerate bimatrix game. Moreover, an edge of N may be
efficiently oriented, and using this orientation, we determine the index of every Nash equilibria for a
bimatrix game. Further, in Section 3 we show that if Γ contains only rank-1 games (i.e., C = −A)
then N does not contain any cycle and the fully-labeled path exhibits a strict monotonicity. Using
1 The actual result is for N player game space.
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this monotonic nature, we establish homeomorphism maps between Γ and EΓ . This is the first
structural result for a subspace of the bimatrix game space. The homeomorphism maps that we
derive are very different than the ones given by Kohlberg and Mertens for the bimatrix game space
[9], and require a structural understanding of EΓ .
Using the above facts on the structure of N , in Section 4 we present two algorithms. For a given
rank-1 game (A,−A + γ.βT ), we consider the subspace Γ = {(A,−A + α.βT ) | α ∈ Rm}. Note
that Γ contains the given game and the corresponding set N is a path which captures all the Nash
equilibria of the game. The first algorithm (BinSearch) finds a Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game
in polynomial time by applying binary search on the fully-labeled path using the monotonic nature
of the path. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first polynomial time algorithm to find an
exact Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game.
The second algorithm (Enumeration) enumerates all the Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game. Using
the fact that N contains only the fully-labeled path, the Enumeration algorithm traces this path
and locates all the Nash equilibria of the game. For an arbitrary bimatrix game, we may define a
suitable Γ containing the game. Since the fully-labeled path of the corresponding N covers at least
one Nash equilibrium of all the games in Γ , the Enumeration algorithm locates at least one Nash
equilibrium of the given bimatrix game. Theobald [21] also gave an algorithm to enumerate all the
Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game, however it may not be generalized to find a Nash equilibrium of
any bimatrix game. Moreover, our algorithm is much simpler and a detailed comparison is given
in Section 4.2. There, we also compare our algorithm with the Lemke-Howson algorithm, which
follows a path of almost2 fully-labeled points [14].
For a given rank-k game (A,B), the matrix (A+B) may be written as
∑k
l=1 γ
l.βl
T
, where ∀l, γl ∈
R
m and βl ∈ Rn. We define a km-dimensional affine subspace Γ k = {(A,−A+
∑k
l=1 α
l.βl
T
) | αl ∈
R
m,∀l} of Ω. In Section 5, we establish a homeomorphism between Γ k and its Nash equilibrium
correspondence EΓ k using techniques similar to the rank-1 homeomorphism. Further, to find a Nash
equilibrium of a rank-k game we give a piece-wise linear polynomial-time computable fixed point
formulation on [0, 1]k using the homeomorphism result and discuss the possibility of a polynomial
time algorithm.
2 Games and Nash Equilibrium
2.1 Preliminaries
Notations. For a matrix A = [aij ] ∈ R
mn of dimension m×n, let Ai be the i
th row and Aj be the
jth column of the matrix. Let 0l×k and 1l×k be the matrices of dimension l × k with all 0s and all
1s respectively. For a vector α ∈ Rm, let αi be its i
th coordinate. Vectors are considered as column
vectors.
For a finite two players game, let the strategy sets of the first and the second player be S1 =
{1, . . . ,m} and S2 = {1, . . . , n} respectively. The payoff function of such a game may be represented
by the two payoff matrices (A,B) ∈ Rmn × Rmn, each of dimension m× n. If the played strategy
profile is (i, j) ∈ S1×S2, then the payoffs of the first and second players are aij and bij respectively.
Note that the rows of these matrices correspond to the strategies of the first player and the columns
to that of the second player, hence the first player is also referred to as the row-player and second
player as the column-player.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the available set of strategies. The set of
mixed strategies for the row-player is ∆1 = {(x1, . . . , xm) | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S1,
∑m
i=1 xi = 1} and for
2 For a fixed label 1 ≤ r ≤ m+ n, all the labels except r should be present.
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the column-player, it is ∆2 = {(y1, . . . , yn) | yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S2,
∑n
j=1 yj = 1}. The strategies in S1
and S2 are called pure strategies. If the strategy profile (x, y) ∈ ∆1×∆2 is played, then the payoffs
of the row-player and column-player are xTAy and xTBy respectively.
A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile (NESP) if no player achieves
a better payoff by a unilateral deviation [13]. Formally, (x, y) ∈ ∆1 × ∆2 is a NESP iff ∀x
′ ∈
∆1, x
TAy ≥ x′TAy and ∀y′ ∈ ∆2, x
TBy ≥ xTBy′. These conditions may also be equivalently
stated as follows.
∀i ∈ S1, xi > 0 ⇒ Aiy = maxk∈S1 Aky
∀j ∈ S2, yj > 0 ⇒ x
TBj = maxk∈S2 x
TBk
(1)
From (1), it is clear that at a Nash equilibrium, a player plays a pure strategy with non-zero
probability only if it gives the maximum payoff with respect to (w.r.t.) the opponent’s strategy.
Such strategies are called the best response strategies (w.r.t. the opponent’s strategy). The polytope
P in (2) is closely related to the best response strategies of the row-player for any given strategy of
the column-player [14] and it is called the best response polytope of the row-player. Similarly, the
polytope Q is called the best response polytope of the column-player. In the following expression,
x and y are vector variables, and π1 and π2 are scalar variables.
P = { (y, π1) ∈ R
n+1 | Aiy − π1 ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S2;
∑n
j=1 yj = 1}
Q = { (x, π2) ∈ R
m+1 | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; x
TBj − π2 ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ S2;
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}
(2)
Note that for any y′ ∈ ∆2, a unique (y
′, π′1) may be obtained on the boundary of P , where
π′1 = maxi∈S1 Aiy
′. Clearly, the pure strategy i ∈ S1 is in the best response against y
′ only if
Aiy
′ − π′1 = 0, hence indices in S1 corresponding to the tight inequalities at (y
′, π′1) are in the best
response. Note that, in both the polytopes the first set of inequalities correspond to the row-player,
and the second set correspond to the column player. Since |S1| = m and |S2| = n, let the inequalities
be numbered from 1 to m, and m+1 to m+n in both the polytopes. Let the label L(v) of a point
v in the polytope be the set of indices of the tight inequalities at v. If a pair (v,w) ∈ P ×Q is such
that L(v) ∪ L(w) = {1, . . . ,m+ n}, then it is called a fully-labeled pair.
Lemma 1. A strategy profile (x, y) is a NESP of the game (A,B) iff ((y, π1), (x, π2)) ∈ P ×Q is
a fully-labeled pair, for some π1 and π2 [14].
A game is called non-degenerate if both the polytopes are non-degenerate. Note that for a non-
degenerate game, |L(v)| ≤ n and |L(w)| ≤ m, ∀(v,w) ∈ P ×Q, and the equality holds iff v and w
are the vertices of P and Q respectively. Therefore, a fully-labeled pair of a non-degenerate game
has to be a vertex-pair. However, for a degenerate game, there may be a fully-labeled pair (v,w),
which is not a vertex-pair. In that case, if v is on a face of P , then every point v′ of this face makes
a fully-labeled pair with w since L(v) ⊆ L(v′). Similarly, if w is on a face of Q, then every point w′
of this face makes a fully-labeled pair with v.
Let E = {(A,B, x, y) ∈ Rmn × Rmn × ∆1 × ∆2 | (x, y) is a NESP of the game (A,B)} be the
Nash equilibrium correspondence of the bimatrix game space R2mn (i.e., Rmn×Rmn). Kohlberg and
Mertens [9] proved that E is homeomorphic to the bimatrix game space R2mn. No such structural
result is known for a subspace of the bimatrix game space R2mn. To extend such a result for a
subspace, in the next section, we define an m-dimensional affine subspace of R2mn and analyze the
structure of it’s Nash equilibrium correspondence.
2.2 Game Space and the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence
Let Γ = {(A,C + α · βT ) | α ∈ Rm} be a game space, where A ∈ Rmn and C ∈ Rmn are m × n
dimensional non-zero matrices, and β ∈ Rn is an n-dimensional non-zero vector. Note that for a
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game (A,B) ∈ Γ , there exists a unique α ∈ Rm, such that B = C + α · βT . Therefore, Γ may
be parametrized by α, and let G(α) be the game (A,C + α · βT ) ∈ Γ . Clearly, Γ forms an m-
dimensional affine subspace of the bimatrix game space R2mn. Let EΓ = {(α, x, y) ∈ R
m ×∆1 ×
∆2 | (x, y) is a NESP of the game G(α) ∈ Γ} be the Nash equilibrium correspondence of Γ . We
wish to investigate: Is EΓ homeomorphic to the game space Γ (≡ R
m)?
For a game G(α) ∈ Γ , let the best response polytopes of row-player and column-player be P (α)
and Q(α) respectively. Since the row-player’s matrix is fixed to A, hence P (α) is the same for all
α and we denote it by P . However, Q(α) varies with α. We define a new polytope Q′ in (3), which
encompasses Q(α), for all G(α) ∈ Γ .
Q′ = {(x, λ, π2) ∈ R
m+2 | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; x
TCj + βjλ− π2 ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ S2;
m∑
i=1
xi = 1} (3)
Note that the inequalities of Q′ may also be numbered from 1 to m+ n in a similar fashion as
in Q. For a game G(α), the polytope Q(α) may be obtained by replacing λ by
∑m
i=1 αixi in Q
′. In
other words, Q(α) is the projection of Q′∩{(x, λ, π2) |
∑m
i=1 αixi−λ = 0} on the (x, π2)-space. Let
N = {(v,w) ∈ P ×Q′ | L(v) ∪ L(w) = {1, . . . ,m+ n}} be the set of fully-labeled pairs in P ×Q′.
The following lemma relates EΓ and N .
Lemma 2. 1. If ((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N , then there is an α ∈ R
m such that (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ .
2. For every (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ , there exist unique π1, π2 and λ in R, s.t. ((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N .
Proof. For the first part, suppose (v,w) is a fully-labeled pair with v = (y, π1) and w = (x, λ, π2).
Let α ∈ Rm be such that
∑m
i=1 αixi−λ = 0, then clearly (v, (x, π2)) ∈ P (α)×Q(α) is a fully-labeled
pair. Therefore, (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ .
For the second part, let (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ , then for π1 = x
TAy and π2 = x
T (C + α · βT )y, we
get a fully labeled pair ((y, π1), (x, π2)) ∈ P (α) × Q(α). Hence, for λ =
∑m
i=1 αixi, the point
((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) is in N . ⊓⊔
From Lemma 2, it is clear that there is a continuous surjective map from EΓ to N . We further
strengthen the connection in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. EΓ is connected iff N is a single connected component.
Proof. (⇒) Lemma 2 shows that for a point (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ , we may construct a unique point
((y, xTAy), (x, xTα, xT (C +α ·βT )y)) ∈ N . This gives a continuous surjective function f : EΓ →
N . Therefore, if EΓ is connected then N is connected as well.
(⇐) For a (v,w) ∈ N , where w = (x, λ, π2), all the points in f−1(v,w) satisfy
∑m
i=1 xiαi = λ,
hence f−1(v,w) is homeomorphic to Rm−1. Since N is connected, f is continuous and the fact that
the fibers f−1(v,w), ∀(v,w) ∈ N are connected imply that EΓ is connected. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2 and 3 imply that EΓ and N are closely related. Henceforth, we assume that the
polytopes P and Q′ are non-degenerate. Recall that when the best response polytopes (P and Q)
of a game are non-degenerate, all the fully-labeled pairs are vertex pairs. However Q′ has one more
variable λ than Q, which gives one extra degree of freedom to form the fully-labeled pairs. We show
that the structure of N is very simple by proving the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The set of fully-labeled points N admits the following decomposition into mutually
disjoint connected components. N = P ∪ C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck, k ≥ 0, where P and Cis respectively form a
path and cycles on 1-skeleton of P ×Q′.
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In order to prove Proposition 4, first we identify the points in P and Q′ separately, which
participate in the fully-labeled pairs and then relate them. For a v ∈ P , let Ev = {w
′ ∈ Q′ | (v,w′) ∈
N}, and similarly for a w ∈ Q′, let Ew = {v
′ ∈ P | (v′, w) ∈ N}. Let N P = {v ∈ P | Ev 6= ∅} and
NQ
′
= {w ∈ Q′ | Ew 6= ∅}.
For neighboring vertices u and v in either polytopes, let u, v be the edge between u and v. Recall
that P and Q′ are non-degenerate, therefore ∀v ∈ P, |L(v)| ≤ n and ∀w ∈ Q′, |L(w)| ≤ m + 1.
Using this fact, it is easy to deduce the following observations for points in P . Similar results hold
for the points in Q′.
O1. If (v,w) ∈ N , then both v and w lie on either 0 or 1-dimensional faces of P and Q
′ respectively,
and at least one of them is a 0-dimensional face, i.e., a vertex.
O2. If (v,w) ∈ N and both v and w are vertices, then |L(v) ∩ L(w)| = 1, and the element in the
intersection is called the duplicate label of the pair (v,w).
O3. If v ∈ P is not a vertex then Ev is either empty or it equals exactly one vertex of Q
′.
O4. If v ∈ P is a vertex, then Ev is either empty or an edge of Q
′.
O5. Let v ∈ P be a vertex and Ev be an edge of Q
′. If w ∈ Ev is a vertex, then (v,w) has a duplicate
label (see O2). Let the duplicate label be i, then there exists a unique vertex v
′ ∈ P adjacent to
v such that v, v′ ∈ N P , where v′ is obtained by relaxing the inequality i at v. This also implies
that Ew = v, v′ and Ev ∩ Ev′ = w.
The above observations, brings out the structure of N significantly. Every point in N is a pair
(v,w) where v ∈ P and w ∈ Q′. From O1, one of them is a vertex (say v), and the other is on the
corresponding edge (w ∈ Ev). Hence N contains only 0 and 1-dimensional faces of P ×Q
′. Clearly,
an edge of N is of type (v, Ev) or (Ew, w), where v and w are the vertices of P and Q
′ respectively.
Note that a vertex (v,w) of N corresponds to a fully-labeled vertex-pair of P ×Q′, and hence
it has a duplicate label (by O2). Relaxing the inequality corresponding to the duplicate label in P
and Q′ separately, we get the edges (Ew, w) and (v, Ev) of N respectively. Clearly, these are the only
adjacent edges of the vertex (v,w) in N . Hence, in a component of N , edges alternate between type
(v, Ev) and (Ew, w), and the degree of every vertex of N is exactly two. Therefore, N consists of
infinite paths and cycles on the 1-skeleton of P ×Q′. Note that a path in N has unbounded edges
on both the sides. Further, a component of N may be constructed by combining a component of
N P (say C) and the corresponding component of NQ
′
({Ev | v ∈ C}).
Using the above analysis, we only need to show that there is exactly one path in N to prove
Proposition 4. Let the support-pair of a vertex (y, π2) ∈ P be (I, J) where I = {i ∈ S1 | Aiy−π2 = 0}
and J = {j ∈ S2 | yj > 0}. Note that |L(y, π2)| = n, hence |I| = |J |. Let βjs = minj∈S2 βj ,
is = argmaxi∈S1 aijs , βje = maxj∈S2 βe, and ie = argmaxi∈S1 aije . In other words, the indices js
and je correspond to the minimum and maximum entries in β respectively, and the indices is and
ie correspond to the maximum entry in A
js and Aje respectively. It is easy to see that js 6= je, since
Q′ is non-degenerate.
Lemma 5. There exist two vertices vs and ve in P , with support-pairs ({is}, {js}) and ({ie}, {je})
respectively.
Proof. Let y ∈ ∆2 be such that yjs = 1 and yj = 0, ∀j 6= js. Clearly, vs = (y, aisjs) ∈ P and
|L(vs)| = n. Similarly, the vertex ve ∈ P may be obtained by setting yje = 1 and the remaining yjs
to zero. ⊓⊔
Next we show that there are exactly two unbounded edges of type (v, Ev) in N , all other edges
have two bounding vertices.
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Lemma 6. An edge (v, Ev) ∈ N has exactly one bounding vertex if v is either vs or ve, otherwise
it has two bounding vertices.
Proof. Let v = vs. The points in Ev satisfy
xis = 1 and ∀i 6= is, xi = 0, π2 = cisjs + βjsλ (4)
∀j 6= js, cisj + βjλ ≤ cisjs + βjsλ
Since βj ≥ βjs , we get λ ≤
cisjs − cisj
βj − βjs
. Let λs = min
j 6=js
cisjs − cisj
βj − βjs
, then Ev = {(x, λ, π2) | λ ∈
(−∞, λs], x and π2 satisfy (4)}. Note that on Ev, x is a constant and λ varies from −∞ to λs.
Moreover the point corresponding to λ = λs is a vertex, because one more inequality becomes tight
there. Similarly for v = ve, λ varies from λe = max
j 6=je
ciej − cieje
βje − βj
to ∞ on Ev, and λ = λe corresponds
to a vertex of Ev.
Let a vertex v ∈ P be such that v 6= vs, v 6= ve and Ev 6= ∅. We show that Ev has exactly two
bounding vertices. Let (I, J) be the support-pair corresponding to v. There are two cases.
Case 1 - |I| = |J | = 1: Let I = {i1} and J = {j1}. Then for all the points in Ev, xi1 = 1 and all
other xis are zero. Let Jl = {j | βj < βj1} and Jg = {j | βj > βj1}. Clearly js ∈ Jl and je ∈ Jg. All
the points in Ev must satisfy the inequalities ci1j + βjλ ≤ ci1j1 + βj1λ, ∀j /∈ J , and using them, we
get the following upper and lower bounds on λ.
max
j∈Jg
ci1j1 − ci1j
βj − βj1
≤ λ ≤ max
j∈Jl
ci1j − ci1j1
βj1 − βj
Therefore, the values of λ on Ev, form a closed and bounded interval, and for each extreme point
of this interval, there is a vertex in Ev.
Case 2 - |I| = |J | > 1: Note that exactly m inequalities of Q′ are tight at Ev because |L(v)| = n
and Q′ is non-degenerate. These m tight inequalities with
∑m
i=1 xi = 1 form a 1-dimensional line
L in the (x, λ, π2)-space, and clearly Ev = L ∩ Q
′. Let w = (x, λ, π2) ∈ L and d be a unit vector
along the line L. For a w′ ∈ L, there exists a unique ǫ ∈ R such that w′ = w+ ǫd. Let d(xi) be the
coordinate of d corresponding to xi. Note that
∑m
i=1 d(xi) = 0, because L satisfies
∑m
i=1 xi = 1.
Further ∃i ∈ I such that d(xi) 6= 0, otherwise x becomes constant on L, which in turn imply that
λ and π2 are also constants on L. Hence ∃i1, i2 ∈ I s.t. d(xi1) > 0 and d(xi2) < 0. For all the points
in Ev, the inequalities xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I hold. Using these, we get
xi1 + ǫd(xi1) ≥ 0 ⇒ ǫ ≥
xi1
d(xi1)
, xi2 + ǫd(xi2) ≥ 0 ⇒ ǫ ≤
xi2
d(xi2)
From the above observations, we may easily deduce that the set {ǫ | w + ǫd ∈ Ev} is a closed and
bounded interval [bl, bu]. Moreover, at the extreme points wu = w + bud and wl = w + bld of Ev,
one more inequality is tight. Therefore, wu and wl are the vertices in Ev. ⊓⊔
Now we are in a position to prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4:
For a vertex w = (x, λ, π2) ∈ N
Q′ , ∃r ≤ m such that xr > 0 since
∑m
i=1 xi = 1. In that case,
Ary = π1 holds on the corresponding edge Ew ∈ N
P (O4). This implies that the edge Ew is
bounded from both the sides, since ∀j ∈ S2, 0 ≤ yj ≤ 1 and Amin ≤ π1 ≤ Amax on the edge
Ew, where Amin = min(i,j)∈S1×S2 aij and Amax = max(i,j)∈S1×S2 aij . Therefore, there are exactly
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two unbounded edges in the set N namely (vs, Evs) and (ve, Eve) (Lemma 6). This proves that N
contains exactly one path P, with unbounded edges (vs, Evs) and (ve, Eve) at both the ends. All the
other components of N form cycles (Cis). ⊓⊔
From Proposition 4, it is clear that N contains at least the path P. We show the importance
of P in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 7. For every a ∈ R, there exists a point ((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ P such that λ = a.
Proof. Since P is a continuous path in P ×Q′ (Proposition 4), therefore λ changes continuously on
P. Moreover, in the proof of Lemma 6, we saw that on the edge (vs, Evs) ∈ P, λ varies from −∞ to
λs and on the edge (ve, Eve) ∈ P it varies from λe to ∞. Therefore for any a ∈ R, there is a point
((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) in P such that λ = a. ⊓⊔
Consider a game α ∈ Γ , and the corresponding hyper-plane H ≡ λ−
∑m
i=1 αixi = 0. Note that,
every point in N ∩H corresponds to a NESP of the game G(α) and vice-versa.
Lemma 8. The path P of N covers at least one NESP of the game G(α).
Proof. If there are points in P on opposite sides of H, then the set P ∩H has to be non-empty. Let
w1 = (x
1, λ1, π
1
2) ∈ P and w2 = (x
2, λ2, π
2
2) ∈ P be such that λ1 = mini∈S1 αi and λ2 = maxi∈S1 αi.
Note that w1 and w2 exist (Lemma 7) and they satisfy λ1−
∑m
i=1 αix
1
i ≤ 0 and λ2−
∑m
i=1 αix
2
i ≥ 0.
⊓⊔
Remark 9. The proof of Lemma 8 in fact shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix
game. It is also easy to deduce that the number of Nash equilibria of a non-degenerate bimatrix
game is odd from the fact that N contains a set of cycles and a path (Proposition 4), simply because
a cycle must intersect the hyper-plane H an even number of times, and the path must intersect H
an odd number of times.
From the proof of Proposition 4, it is clear that every vertex of N has a duplicate label and
the two edges incident on a vertex may be easily obtained by relaxing the inequality corresponding
to the duplicate label in P and in Q′. Therefore, given a point of some component of N , it is
easy to trace the full component by leaving the duplicate label in P and in Q′ alternately at every
vertex. Using this fact along with Lemma 8, we design an algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium
of a bimatrix game in Section 4.2. For the moment, we show that the edges of N may be easily
oriented.
Consider a vertex u = (v,w) ∈ N , where v = (y, π1), and w = (x, λ, π2). Let X = {i ∈
S1 | Aiy = π1}, and Y = {j ∈ S2 | x
TCj+βjλ = π2} be ordered sets. Note that X = L(v)∩S1 and
Y = L(w) ∩ S2. Let −X = S1 \X, and −Y = S2 \ Y be the complements. The duplicate label, say
l, of the vertex u is either in X or in Y . Let l ∈ X, i.e., Aly = π1 and xl = 0 hold at u. Let −Ik be
the negative of the k × k identity matrix, A
Y
X
= [aij ]i∈X,j∈Y be the submatrix of A and similarly
β
Y
be the subvector. The set of tight inequalities at v and w may be written as follows:

11×n 0
A
Y
X
A
−Y
X
−1
|X|×1
0
|−Y |×|Y |
−I
|−Y |
0
|−Y |×1



 yYy
−Y
π1

 =


1
0
|X|×1
0
|−Y |×1

 (5)
[
λ x
X
x
−X
π2
]


0 β
Y
0 0
1×|−X|
1m×1
C
Y
X −el
0
|X|×|−X|
C
Y
−X
−I
|−X|
0 −1
1×|Y |
0 0
1×|−X|

 =
[
1 0
1×|Y |
0 0
1×|−X|
]
(6)
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In the above expression −el is a negative unit vector of size m, with −1 in the position cor-
responding to xl. Let the matrices of (5) and (6) be denoted by E(v) and E(w) respectively. For
the case l ∈ Y , E(v) and E(w) may be analogously defined. It is easy to see that the coefficient
matrix of tight equations at u may be written as E(u) =
[
E(v) 0
0 E(w)T
]
. Using det(E(u)) =
det(E(v)) ∗ det(E(w)), we define the sign of vertex u as follows:
s(u) = sign(det(E(u)))
Note that, since E(v) and E(w) are well-defined, s is a well-defined function. Using the function
s on the vertices of N , next we give direction to the edges of N .
Lemma 10. Let E be the set of edges of N , and E′ = {
−−→
u, u′,
←−−
u, u′ | u, u′ ∈ N} be the set of directed
edges. There exists a (efficiently computable) function →: E → E′ such that it maps a cycle of N
to a directed cycle and the path P to a path oriented from (vs, Evs) to (ve, Eve).
Proof. Define the function → as follows: Let u = (v,w) be a vertex of N and let up = (v
′, w) and
uq = (v,w
′) be it’s adjacent vertices obtained by relaxing the inequalities corresponding to it’s
duplicate label in P and in Q′ respectively. If s(u) = +1 then → (u, up) =
−−→u, up and → (u, uq) =
←−−u, uq, otherwise → (u, up) =
←−−u, up and → (u, uq) =
−−→u, uq. In other words, if s(u) = +1 then direct
the edges (Ew, w) and (v, Ev) away from u and towards u respectively, otherwise give opposite
directions.
Note that, → (u, u′) is polynomially computable using any of the s(u) and s(u′). Further, in
order to prove the consistency of function →, we need to show that u and u′ have opposite signs.
Claim. Let u and u′ be adjacent vertices of N , then s(u) ∗ s(u′) = −1, i.e., s(u) and s(u′) are
opposite.
Proof. Let u = (v,w). The proof may be easily deduced from the following facts:
– In a polytope, the coefficient matrix of tight inequalities for the adjacent vertices have deter-
minants of opposite signs if they are the same except for the row which has been exchanged
[20].
– Vertices u and u′ are fully-labeled and both have a duplicate label. Further, to obtain u′ from
u, the inequality corresponding to it’s duplicate label should be relaxed in P or Q′.
– Reordering of the elements in set X (Y ) does not change det(E(u)), since it enforces a reordering
of the corresponding rows (columns) in both E(v) and E(w).
– Reordering of the elements in set −X does not change det(E(u)), since in E(w), the columns
corresponding to the equations of type xi = 0 (except the one with the duplicate label) should
be written such that they form −I
|−X|
. Similarly, reordering of the elements in set −Y does not
change det(E(u)). ⊓⊔
Clearly, the function → maps a cycle of N to a directed cycle. Therefore, we get the directed
traversal of a component of N by leaving the duplicate label in P if the current vertex has positive
sign otherwise leaving the duplicate label in Q′. Further, it is easy to check that the sign associated
with the vertex of the extreme edge (vs, Evs) is positive. Therefore, the path P gets oriented from
(vs, Evs) to (ve, Eve). ⊓⊔
The direction of the edges of N , defined by function →, may be used to determine the index
of every Nash equilibrium for a game in Γ . The definition of index requires the game to be non-
negative, i.e., A > 0, B > 0 [19]. Note that if a game is not non-negative, then it may be modified
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to an equivalent non-negative game by adding a positive constant to its payoff matrices. Let (x, y)
be a NESP of a non-degenerate non-negative bimatrix game (A,B). Let I = {i ∈ S2 | xi > 0} and
J = {j ∈ S1 | yj > 0} with the corresponding submatrices A
J
I
and B
J
I
of the payoff matrices A and
B. Then the index of (x, y) is defined as
(−1)|I|+1sign(det(A
J
I
) ∗ det(B
J
I
))
Let α ∈ Γ be a non-degenerate non-negative game and let H : λ−
∑m
i=1 αixi, H
− and H+ be
the corresponding hyper-plane and half-spaces.
Proposition 11. Let an edge u, u′ ∈ N intersect H at a NESP (x, y) of G(α), and let → (u, u′) =
−−→
u, u′. If u ∈ H− and u′ ∈ H+ then the index of (x, y) is +1, otherwise it is −1.
Proof. Since u, u′ intersects H and the coordinates of y and π1 are zero in H, the edge is of type
(v, Ev). Therefore, let u, u′ = (v,w), (v,w′). Clearly, s(u) = −1 since → (u, u′) =
−−→
u, u′. Let the
ordered sets X, Y and their complements be as defined above. Let l be the duplicate label of u.
Clearly, either l ∈ Y or l ∈ X.
Suppose l ∈ Y . Let d be the direction obtained by relaxing the inequality l at u in Q′, which
leads to the vertex u′. The dot product of d with the normal vector of H may be obtained by
replacing the column corresponding to xTC l + βlλ − π2 = 0 with the normal vector in E(w). If
u ∈ H− and u′ ∈ H+ then this dot product is positive, otherwise it is negative. Next we show that
the expression of the dot product may be simplified to match with the expression of the index of
(x, y).
Let the payoff matrix of the column player in G(α) be denoted by B, i.e., B = C + α · βT and
let a = xTAy and b = xTBy. Since A > 0 and B > 0, a and b are positive. Clearly, the sets I and J
associated with the NESP (x, y) are such that I = X and J = Y \ l. Let k = |I| = |J |. We reorder
the elements in set Y such that Y = [J l]. Note that this does not change the sign of det(E(u)),
since it forces the similar reordering of the columns of both E(v) and E(w). The expression for the
dot product is:
−1
det(E(u))
∗ det


11×n 0
A
J
X
A
l
X
A
−Y
X
−1
|X|×1
0
1×k
−1 0
1×|−Y |
0
0
|−Y |×(k+1)
−I
|−Y |
0
|−Y |×1

 ∗ det


0 β
J
1 0
1×|−X|
1m×1
C
J
X
−α
X
0
|X|×|−X|
C
J
−X
−α−X −I|−X|
0 −1
1×|J|
0 0
1×|−X|


Since I = X and |I| = |J | = k, we get,
(−1)1+(n−k)(2k+4)
det(E(u))
∗ det
[
1
1×k
0
A
J
I
−1
k×1
]
∗ (−1)(m−k)(2k+6) ∗ det


0 β
J
1
1
k×1
C
J
I
−α
I
0 −1
1×k
0


=
−1
det(E(u))
∗ det
[
1
1×k
0
A
J
I
−1
k×1
]
∗ det


0 01×k 1
1
k×1
(C + α · βT )
J
I
−α
I
0 −1
1×k
0


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Since B = C + α · βT , A
J
I
y
J
= a ∗ 1
|I|×1
and xT
I
B
J
I
= b ∗ 1
1×|J|
, we get,
−1
det(E(u))
∗ det
[
1
1×k
1
a
A
J
I
0
k×1
]
∗ (−1)k+3
[
1
k×1
B
J
I
1
b
0
1×k
]
=
(−1)k+2(k+2)
det(E(u)) ∗ a ∗ b
∗ det(A
J
I
) ∗ det(B
J
I
)
=
(−1)k
det(E(u)) ∗ a ∗ b
∗ det(A
J
I
) ∗ det(B
J
I
)
When the duplicate label l is in X, we may derive the same expression for the dot product by
similar reductions. Since s(u) = sign(det(E(u))) = −1, a > 0 and b > 0, the sign of the above
expression is same as the index of (x, y). ⊓⊔
From Proposition 11, it is easy to see that in a component, the index of the Nash equilibria
alternates3. Further, both the first and the last Nash equilibria, on the path P, have index +1. This
proves that the number of Nash equilibria with index +1 is one more than the number of Nash
equilibria with index −1, which is an important known result [19,20].
Recall that N surely contains the path P and in addition it may also contain some cycles. From
Lemma 3, it is clear that if N is disconnected, then EΓ is also disconnected. Example 12 shows
that EΓ may be disconnected in general by illustrating a disconnected N (i.e., N with a cycle).
For a more detailed structural description of EΓ , we refer the reader to Appendix A.
Example 12. Consider the following A, C and β.
A =

0 9 96 6 5
9 7 2

 , C =

6 8 65 8 8
4 3 0

 , β =

97
8

 .
The set N of the corresponding game space Γ contains a path P and a cycle C1. From Proposition 4,
it is clear that a component of N may be obtained from a component of N P and the corresponding
component of NQ
′
. Therefore we demonstrate the path PP and the cycle CP1 of N
P , and using them
P and C1 of N may be easily obtained. The path P
P is vs, v1, v1, ve, where vs = ((0, 1, 0), 9), v1 =
((0.18, 0.82, 0), 7.36) and ve = ((1, 0, 0), 9). The cycle C
P
1 is v2, v3, v3, v4, v4, v2, where v2 =
((0.5, 0, 0.5), 5.5), v3 = ((0.38, 0.18, 0.44), 5.56) and v4 = ((0.4, 0, 0.6), 5.4). Note that vs and
ve correspond to the minimum and maximum βj respectively (Lemma 6). ⊓⊔
Since Γ (≡ Rm) is connected, hence if EΓ is disconnected then it is not homeomorphic to Γ .
3 Rank-1 Space and Homeomorphism
From the discussion of the last section, we know that Γ and EΓ are not homeomorphic in general
(illustrated by Example 12). Surprisingly, they turn out to be homeomorphic if Γ consists of only
rank-1 games, i.e., C = −A. Recall that EΓ forms a single connected component iff N has only
one component (Lemma 3). First we show that when C = −A, the set N consists of only a path.
For a given matrix A ∈ Rmn and a vector β ∈ Rn, we fix the game space to Γ = {(A,−A + α ·
βT ) | α ∈ Rm}. Without loss of generality (wlog) we assume that A and β are non-zero and the
corresponding polytopes P and Q′ are non-degenerate. Lemma 13 shows that the set N may be
easily identified on the polytope P ×Q′.
3 The two endpoints of a LH path also have opposite index [20].
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Lemma 13. For all (v,w) = ((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) in P ×Q
′, we have λ(βT · y) − π1 − π2 ≤ 0, and
the equality holds iff (v,w) ∈ N .
Proof. Recall that C = −A, hence from (2) and (3), we get xT · (A · y − π1) ≤ 0 and (x
T · (−A) +
βTλ−π2)·y ≤ 0. By summing up these two inequalities, we get λ(β
T ·y)−π1−π2 ≤ 0. If (v,w) ∈ N ,
then ∀i ≤ m, xi > 0 ⇒ Ai · y − π1 = 0 and ∀j ≤ n, yj > 0 ⇒ x
T (−Aj) + βjλ − π2 = 0, hence
λ(βT · y)− π1 − π2 = 0.
If (v,w) /∈ N , then at least one label 1 ≤ r ≤ m + n is missing from L(v) ∪ L(w). Let r ≤ m
(wlog), then xr > 0 and Ar · y − π1 < 0, which imply that x
T · (A · y − π1) < 0. Therefore,
λ(βT · y)− π1 − π2 < 0. ⊓⊔
Motivated by the above lemma, we define the following parametrized linear program LP (δ).
LP (δ) : max δ(βT · y)− π1 − π2
(y, π1) ∈ P
(x, λ, π2) ∈ Q
′
λ = δ
(7)
Note that the above linear program may be broken into a parametrized primal linear program
and it’s dual, with δ being the parameter. The primal may be defined on polytope P with the cost
function maximize: δ(βT · y)− π1 and it’s dual is on polytope Q
′ with additional constraint λ = δ
and the cost function minimize: π2.
Remark 14. LP (δ) may look similar to the parametrized linear program, say TLP (ξ), by Theobald
[21]. However the key difference is that TLP (ξ) is defined on the best response polytopes of a given
game (i.e., P (α)×Q(α) for the game G(α)), while LP (δ) is defined on a bigger polytope (P ×Q′)
encompassing best response polytopes of all the games in Γ . A detailed comparison is given in
Section 4.2.
Let OPT (δ) be the set of optimal points of LP (δ). In the next lemma, we show that ∀δ ∈ R,
OPT (δ) is exactly the set of points in N , where λ = δ.
Lemma 15. ∀a ∈ R, OPT (a) = {((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N | λ = a} and OPT (a) 6= ∅.
Proof. Clearly the feasible set of LP (a) consists of all the points of P ×Q′, where λ = a. There-
fore the set {((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N | λ = a} is a subset of the feasible set of LP (a). The set
{((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N | λ = a} is non-empty (Lemma 7). From Lemma 13, it is clear that the
maximum possible value, the cost function of LP (a) may achieve is 0, and it is achieved only at
the points of N . Therefore, OPT (a) = {((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N | λ = a} and OPT (a) 6= ∅. ⊓⊔
Lemma 15 implies that for any a ∈ R, the set OPT (a) is contained in N . Using this, next we
show that N in fact consists of only one component.
Proposition 16. N does not contain cycles.
Proof. Since N consists of a set of edges and vertices and OPT (a) is a convex set, therefore
OPT (a) is contained in a single edge of N (Lemma 15). From Proposition 4, it is clear that there
is a path P in the set N . Further, Lemma 7 shows that for every a ∈ R, there exists a point
((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ P, where λ = a. It implies that OPT (a),∀a ∈ R is contained in the path P.
Therefore there is no other component in N . ⊓⊔
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From Proposition 16, it is clear that N consists of only the path P, henceforth we refer to
N as a path. To construct homeomorphism maps between EΓ and Γ , we need to encode a point
(α, x, y) ∈ EΓ (of size 2m+n) into a vector α
′ ∈ Γ (of size m), such that α′ uniquely identifies the
point (α, x, y) (i.e., a bijection). Recall that for every point in EΓ , there is a unique point on the
path N (Lemma 2). Therefore, first we show that there is a bijection between N and R and using
this, we derive a bijection between Γ and EΓ . Consider the function g : N → R such that
g((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) = β
T · y + λ (8)
Lemma 17. Each term of g, namely βT · y and λ, monotonically increases on the directed path
N , and the function g strictly increases on it.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 4, we know that the edges of type (v, Ev) (where v ∈ N
P is a
vertex) and of type (Ew, w) (where w ∈ N
Q′ is a vertex) alternate in N . Clearly βT ·y is a constant
on an edge of type (v, Ev) and λ is a constant on an edge of type (Ew, w). Now, consider the two
consecutive edges (Ew, w) and (v, Ev), where Ew = v′, v and Ev = w,w′. It is enough to show that λ
and βT · y are not constants on (v, Ev) and (Ew, w) respectively, and β
T · y increases from (v′, w) to
(v,w) (i.e., on (v, Ev)) iff λ also increases from (v,w) to (v,w
′) (i.e., on (Ew, w)).
Let w = (x, λ, π2), w
′ = (x′, λ′, π′2), v = (y, π1) and v
′ = (y′, π′1). Clearly, OPT (λ) = (Ew, w)
and (v,w′) ∈ OPT (λ′) (Lemma 15). Further λ 6= λ′, since OPT (λ) contains only one edge.
Claim. βT · y′ 6= βT · y, and βT · y′ < βT · y ⇔ λ < λ′.
Proof. Since the feasible set of LP (λ′) contains all the points of P×Q′ with λ = λ′, the point (v′, w′)
is a feasible point of LP (λ′). Note that (v′, w′) is a suboptimal point of LP (λ′) otherwise Ew′ = v, v′
and Ev′ = w′, w, which creates a cycle in N . Further, (v,w
′) ∈ OPT (λ′), hence λ′(βT ·y)−π1−π
′
2 >
λ′(βT · y′) − π′1 − π
′
2. Since both (v
′, w) and (v,w) are in OPT (λ), we get λ(βT · y′) − π′1 − π2 =
λ(βT · y)−π1−π2. Summing up these two, we get λ(β
T · y′)+λ′(βT · y) > λ(βT · y)+λ′(βT · y′)⇒
(βT · y − βT · y′)(λ′ − λ) > 0. ⊓⊔
From the above claim, it is clear that βT · y is strictly monotonic on (Ew, w) and λ is strictly
monotonic on (v, Ev). Further, if β
T · y increases on (Ew, w) from (v
′, w) to (v,w) then λ increases
on (v, Ev) from (v,w) to (v,w
′) and vice-versa.
Recall that on the directed path N , (vs, Evs) is the first edge and (ve, Eve) is the last edge
(Lemma 10). Further, λ varies from −∞ to λs on the first edge (vs, Evs), and it varies from λe to
∞ on the last edge (ve, Eve) (proof of Lemma 6). Therefore, λ and β
T · y increase monotonically on
the directed path N , and in turn g strictly increases from −∞ to ∞ on the path. ⊓⊔
Lemma 17 implies that g is a continuous, bijective function with a continuous inverse g−1 : R→
N . Now consider the following candidate function f : EΓ → Γ for the homeomorphism map.
f(α, x, y) = (βT · y + αT · x, α2 − α1, . . . , αm − α1)
T (9)
Using the properties of g, next we show that f indeed establishes a homeomorphism between
Γ and EΓ .
Theorem 18. EΓ is homeomorphic to Γ .
Proof. The function f of (9) is continuous because it is a quadratic function. Further, we show that
it is bijective.
Claim. f is a bijective function.
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Proof. We prove this by illustrating an inverse function f−1 : Γ → EΓ . Given α
′ ∈ Γ , let (v,w) =
((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) = g
−1(α′1) be the corresponding point in N . This gives the values of x, y and λ.
Using these values, we solve the following equalities with the variable vector a = (a1, . . . , am).
∀i > 1, ai = α
′
i + a1 (10)
m∑
i=1
xiai = α
′
1 − β
T · y (11)
It is easy to see that the above equations have a unique solution, which gives a unique value for
the vector a and a unique point (a, x, y) ∈ EΓ . Clearly, f(a, x, y) = α
′. ⊓⊔
The inverse map f−1 illustrated in the proof of the above claim is also continuous. The continuous
maps f and f−1 establish the homeomorphism between EΓ and Γ . ⊓⊔
4 Algorithms
In this section, we present two algorithms to find Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game using the
structure and monotonicity of N . First we discuss a polynomial time algorithm to find a Nash
equilibrium of a non-degenerate rank-1 game. It does a binary search on N using the monotonicity
of λ. Later we give a path-following algorithm which enumerates all Nash equilibria of a rank-1
game, and finds at least one for any bimatrix game (Lemma 8).
Recall that the best response polytopes P and Q (of (2)) of a non-degenerate game are non-
degenerate, and hence it’s Nash equilibrium set is finite. Consider a non-degenerate rank-1 bimatrix
game (A,B) ∈ R2mn such that A + B = γ · βT , where γ ∈ Rm and β ∈ Rn. We assume that β is
a non-zero and non-constant4 vector, and both A and B are rational matrices. Let c be the LCM
of the denominators of the aijs, βis and γis. Note that multiplying both A and B by c
2 makes A,
γ and β integers, and the total bit length of the input gets multiplied by at most O(m2n2), which
is a polynomial increase. Since scaling both the matrices of a bimatrix game by a positive integer
does not change the set of Nash equilibria, we assume that entries of A, γ and β are integers.
Now consider the game space Γ = {(A,−A+α · β) | α ∈ Rm}. Clearly, G(γ) = (A,B) ∈ Γ and
the corresponding polytopes P and Q′ of (3) are non-degenerate. Let N be the set of fully-labeled
points of P ×Q′ as defined in Section 2.2. By Lemma 2, we know that for every Nash equilibrium
of the game G(γ), there is a unique point in N .
Consider the hyper-plane H : λ−
∑m
i=1 γixi = 0 in (y, π1, x, λ, π2)-space and the corresponding
half spaces H+ : λ −
∑m
i=1 γixi ≥ 0 and H
− : λ −
∑m
i=1 γixi ≤ 0. It is easy to see that a point
w ∈ N corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of G(γ) only if w ∈ H. Therefore the intersection of N
with the hyper-plane H gives all the Nash equilibria of G(γ). If the hyper-plane H intersects an
edge of N , then it intersects the edge exactly at one point, because G(γ) is a non-degenerate game.
Let γmin = mini∈S1 γi and γmax = maxi∈S1 γi. Since ∀x ∈ ∆1, γmin ≤
∑m
i=1 γixi ≤ γmax, a
point w ∈ N corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of G(γ), only if the value of λ at w is between γmin
and γmax. From Proposition 16, we know that N contains only a path. If we consider the path N
from the first edge (vs, Evs) to the last edge (ve, Eve), then λ monotonically increases from −∞ to
∞ on it (Lemmas 6 and 17). Therefore all the points, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of
G(γ) on the path N , lie between OPT (γmin) and OPT (γmax) (Lemma 15).
4 If β is a constant vector, then the game (A,B) may be converted into a zero-sum game without changing it’s Nash
equilibrium set, by adding constants in the columns and rows of A and B respectively.
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4.1 Rank-1 NE: A Polynomial Time Algorithm
Recall that finding a Nash equilibrium of the game G(γ) is equivalent to finding a point in the
intersection of N and the hyper-plane H. As λ increases monotonically on N , and all the points
in the intersection are between the points of N corresponding to λ = γmin and λ = γmax, the
BinSearch algorithm of Table 1 applies binary search on λ to locate a point in the intersection.
BinSearch(γmin, γmax)
a1 ← γmin; a2 ← γmax;
if IsNE(a1) = 0 or IsNE(a2) = 0 then return;
while true
a← a1+a22 ; flag ← IsNE(a);
if flag = 0 then break;
else if flag < 0 then a1 ← a;
else a2 ← a;
endwhile
return;
IsNE(δ)
Find OPT (δ) by solving LP (δ);
u, v ← The edge containing OPT (δ); H ← {w ∈ u, v | w ∈ H};
if H 6= ∅ then Output H; return 0;
else if u, v ∈ H+ then return 1;
else return −1;
Table 1. BinSearch Algorithm
The IsNE procedure of Table 1 takes a δ ∈ R as the input, and outputs a NESP if possible,
otherwise it indicates the position of OPT (δ) with respect to the hyper-plane H. First it finds the
optimal set OPT (δ) of LP (δ) and the corresponding edge u, v containing OPT (δ). Next, it finds a
set H, which consists of all the points in the intersection of u, v and the hyper-plane H if any, i.e.,
Nash equilibria of G(γ). Since the game G(γ) is non-degenerate, H is either a singleton or empty.
In the former case, the procedure outputs H and returns 0 indicating that a Nash equilibrium has
been found. However in the latter case, it returns 1 if u, v ∈ H+ otherwise it returns −1, indicating
the position of u, v w.r.t. the hyper-plane H.
The BinSearch algorithm maintains two pivot values a1 and a2 of λ such that the corresponding
OPT (a1) ∈ H
− and OPT (a2) ∈ H
+, i.e., always on the opposite sides of the hyper-plane H.
Clearly N crosses H at least once between OPT (a1) and OPT (a2). Since OPT (γmin) ∈ H
− and
OPT (γmax) ∈ H
+, the pivots a1 and a2 are initialized to γmin and γmax respectively. Initially it
calls IsNE for both a1 and a2 separately and terminates if either returns zero indicating that a
NESP has been found. Otherwise the algorithm repeats the following steps until IsNE returns zero:
It calls IsNE for the mid point a of a1 and a2 and terminates if it returns zero. If IsNE returns a
negative value, then OPT (a) ∈ H− implying that OPT (a) and OPT (a2) are on the opposite sides
of H, and hence the lower pivot a1 is reset to a. In the other case OPT (a) ∈ H
+, the upper pivot
a2 is set to a, as OPT (a1) and OPT (a) are on the opposite sides of H.
Note that, the index of the Nash equilibrium obtained by BinSearch algorithm is always +1,
since a1 < a2 is an invariant (Proposition 11). For X ∈ Rmn, let X˜ = maxi∈S1,j∈S2 |xij|. Since the
column-player’s payoff matrix is represented by−A+γ·βT of the game G(γ), let |B| = max{A˜, β˜, γ˜}.
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Theorem 19. Let L be the bit length of the input. The BinSearch terminates in time poly(L,m, n).
Proof. From the above discussion it is clear that the algorithm terminates when the call IsNE(a)
outputs a NESP of G(γ). Let the range of λ for an edge (v, Ev) ∈ N be [λ1 λ2]. Let ∆ = (m +
2)! (|B|)(m+2).
Claim. λ2 − λ1 ≥
1
∆2
.
Proof. Note that λ1 and λ2 correspond to the two vertices of Ev ∈ Q
′. Since Q′ is in a (m + 2)-
dimensional space, hence there are m+ 2 equations tight at every vertex of it. Hence both λ1 and
λ2 are rational numbers with denominator at most ∆. Therefore λ2 − λ1 is at least
1
∆2
. ⊓⊔
From the above claim, it is clear that when a2 − a1 ≤
1
∆2
, OPT (a1) and OPT (a2) are either
part of the same edge or adjacent edges. In either case, the algorithm terminates after one more call
to IsNE, because IsNE checks if the edge corresponding to OPT (a) contains a Nash equilibrium of
G(γ).
Clearly a2 − a1 =
γmax − γmin
2l
after l iterations of the while loop. Let k be such that
γmax − γmin
2k
=
1
∆2
⇒ 2k = ∆2(γmax − γmin)⇒
k = 2 log∆+ log(γmax − γmin) ≤ O(m logm+m log |B|+ log(γmax − γmin))
BinSearch makes at most k + 1 calls to the procedure IsNE, which is polynomial in L,m,
and n. The procedure IsNE solves a linear program and computes a set H, both may be done in
poly(L,m, n) time. Therefore the total time taken by BinSearch is polynomial in L,m, and n. ⊓⊔
4.2 Enumeration Algorithm for Rank-1 Games
The Enumeration algorithm of Table 2 simply follows the pathN between OPT (γmin) andOPT (γmax),
and outputs the NESPs whenever it hits the hyper-plane H : λ−
∑m
i=1 γixi = 0.
Enumeration(u1, v1, u2, v2)
u, u′ ← u1, v1;
if u, u′ of type (v, Ev) then flag ← 1;
else flag ← 0;
while true
H = {w ∈ u, u′ | w ∈ H}; Output H;
if u, u′ = u2, v2 then break;
if flag = 1 then u, u′ ← (Eu′ , u
′); flag ← 0;
else u, u′ ← (u′, Eu′); flag ← 1;
endwhile
return;
Table 2. Enumeration Algorithm
We obtain OPT (γmin) and OPT (γmax) on the path N by solving LP (γmin) and LP (γmax)
respectively. Let the edges u1, v1 and u2, v2 contain OPT (γmin) and OPT (γmax) respectively. The
call Enumeration(u1, v1, u2, v2) enumerates all the Nash equilibria of the game G(γ).
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The Enumeration algorithm initializes u, u′ to the edge u1, v1. Since the edges alternate between
the type (v, Ev) and (Ew, w) on N , the value of flag indicates the type of edge to be considered next.
It is set to one if the next edge is of type (Ew, w), otherwise it is set to zero. In the while loop, it
first outputs the intersection of the edge u, u′ and the hyper-plane H, if any. Further, if the value
of the flag is one then u, u′ is set to (Eu′ , u
′), otherwise it is set to (u′, Eu′), and the flag is toggled.
Recall that the edges incident on a vertex u′ in N may be obtained by relaxing the inequality
corresponding to the duplicate label of u′, in P and in Q′ (Section 2.2). Let the duplicate label of
the vertex u′ be i. We may obtain the edge (Eu′ , u
′) by relaxing the inequality i of P and the edge
(u′, Eu′) by relaxing the inequality i of Q
′. The algorithm terminates when u, u′ = u2, v2.
Every iteration of the loop takes time polynomial in L, m and n. Therefore, the time taken by
the algorithm is equivalent to the number of edges on N between u1, v1 and u2, v2.
For a general bimatrix game (A,B), we may obtain C, γ and β such that B = C + γ · βT , and
define the corresponding game space Γ and the polytopes P and Q′ accordingly (Section 2.2). There
is a one-to-one correspondence between the Nash equilibria of the game (A,B) and the points in
the intersection of the fully-labeled set N and the hyper-plane λ−
∑m
i=1 γixi = 0. Recall that the
set N contains one path (P) and a set of cycles (Proposition 4). The extreme edges (vs, Evs) and
(ve, Eve) of P may be easily obtained as described in the proof of Lemma 6. Since P contains at least
one Nash equilibrium of every game in Γ (Lemma 8), hence the call Enumerate((vs, Evs), (ve, Eve))
outputs at least one Nash equilibrium of the game (A,B). Note that the time taken by the algorithm
again depends on the number of edges on the path P.
Comparison with Earlier Approaches. The Enumeration algorithm may be compared to two
previous algorithms. One is the Theobald algorithm [21], which enumerates all Nash equilibria of
a rank-1 game, and the other is the Lemke-Howson algorithm [11], which finds a Nash equilibrium
of any bimatrix game. The Enumeration algorithm enumerates all the Nash equilibria of a rank-1
game and for any general bimatrix game it is guaranteed to find one Nash equilibrium. All three
algorithms are path following algorithms. However, the main difference is that both the previous
algorithms always trace a path on the best response polytopes of a given game (i.e., P (γ)×Q(γ)),
while the Enumeration algorithm follows a path on a bigger polytope P × Q′ which encompasses
best response polytopes of all the games of an m-dimensional game space. Therefore, for every
game in this m-dimensional game space, the Enumeration follows the same path. Further, all the
points on the path followed by Enumeration algorithm are fully-labeled, and it always hits the
best response polytope of the given game at one of it’s NESP points. However the path followed
by previous two algorithms is not fully-labeled and whenever they hit a fully-labeled point, it is a
NESP of the game.
In every intermediate step, the Theobald algorithm calculates the range of a variable (ξ) based
on the feasibility of primal and dual, and accordingly decides which inequality to relax (in P or Q)
to locate the next edge. While Enumeration algorithm simply leaves the duplicate label in P or Q′
(alternately) at the current vertex to locate the next edge. Further, for a general bimatrix game,
the Enumeration algorithm locates at least one Nash equilibrium, while Theobald algorithm works
only for rank-1 games.
For rank-1 games there may be a polynomial bound for the Enumeration algorithm, because
experiments suggest that the path N contains very few edges for randomly generated rank-1 games.
5 Rank-k Space and Homeomorphism
It turns out that the approach used to show the homeomorphism between the subspace of rank-1
games and it’s Nash equilibrium correspondence may be extended to the subspace with rank-k
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games. Given a bimatrix game (A,B) ∈ R2mn of rank-k, the matrix A + B may be written as∑k
l=1 γ
l · βl
T
, using the linearly independent vectors γl ∈ Rm, βl ∈ Rn, 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Therefore,
the column-player’s payoff matrix B may be written as B = −A +
∑k
l=1 γ
l · βl
T
. Consider the
corresponding game space Γ k = {(A,−A +
∑k
l=1 α
l · βl
T
) ∈ R2mn | ∀l ≤ k, αl ∈ Rm}, where
{βl}kl=1 are linearly independent. This space is an affine km-dimensional subspace of the bimatrix
game space R2mn, and it contains only rank-k games. Let α = (α1, . . . , αk), and G(α) denote the
game (A,−A +
∑k
l=1 α
l · βl
T
). The Nash equilibrium correspondence of the space Γ k is EΓ k =
{(α, x, y) ∈ Rkm ×∆1 ×∆2 | (x, y) is a NESP of G(α) ∈ Γ
k}.
For all the games in Γ k, again the row-player’s payoff matrix remains constant, hence for all
G(α) ∈ Γ k the best response polytope of the row-player P (α) is P of (2). However, the best response
polytope of the column player Q(α) varies, as the payoff matrix of the column-player varies with
α. Consider the following polytope (similar to (3)).
Q′k = {(x, λ, π2) ∈ R
m+k+1 | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S1; (12)
xT (−Aj) +
k∑
l=1
βljλl − π2 ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ S2;
m∑
i=1
xi = 1}
Note that λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) is a variable vector. The column-player’s best response polytope
Q(α), for the game G(α), is the projection of the set {(x, λ, π2) ∈ Q
′k | ∀l ≤ k,
∑m
i=1 α
l
ixi−λl = 0}
on (x, π2)-space. We assume that the polytopes P and Q
′k are non-degenerate. Let the set of fully-
labeled pairs of P ×Q′k be N k = {(v,w) ∈ P ×Q′k | L(v)∪L(w) = {1, . . . ,m+n}}. The following
facts regarding the set N k may be easily derived.
– For every point in EΓ k there is a unique point in N
k, and for every point in N k there is a
point in EΓ k (Lemma 2). Further the set of points of EΓ k mapping to a point (v,w) ∈ N
k, is
equivalent to k(m− 1)-dimensional space.
– Since there are k more variables in Q′k, namely λ1, . . . , λk compared to Q of (2), N
k is a subset
of the k-skeleton of P ×Q′k. If a point v ∈ P is on a d-dimensional face (d ≤ k), then the set
Ev is either empty or it is a (k − d)-dimensional face, where Ev = {w ∈ Q
′k | (v,w) ∈ N k}
(Observations of Section 2.2).
– For every (v,w) = ((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) in P ×Q
′k,
∑k
l=1 λl(β
lT · y) − π1 − π2 ≤ 0, and equality
holds iff (v,w) ∈ N k.
For a vector δ ∈ Rk, consider the following parametrized linear program LP k(δ).
LP k(δ) : max
∑k
l=1 δl(β
lT · y)− π1 − π2
(y, π1) ∈ P
(x, λ, π2) ∈ Q
′k
λl = δl,∀l ≤ k
(13)
Let OPT k(δ) be the set of optimal points of LP k(δ). Note that for any a ∈ Rk, all the points on
N k with λ = a may be obtained by solving LP k(a). In other words, {((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N
k | λ =
a} = OPT k(a) (Lemma 15). Using this fact we show that the tuple (λ1 + β
1T · y, . . . , λk + β
kT · y)
uniquely identifies a point of N k. For a vector a ∈ Rk, let S(a) = {((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N
k | ∀l ≤
k, λl + β
lT · y = al}.
Lemma A. For a vector a ∈ Rk, the set S(a) contains exactly one element, i.e., |S(a)| = 1.
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Proof. First we show that S(a) 6= ∅. Let S1(a) = {((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) ∈ N
k | ∀l > 1, λl+β
lT ·y = al}.
Using the similar analysis as in Lemmas 6 and 7, it may be easily shown that for every b ∈ R there
is a point in S1(a) such that λ1 + β
1T · y = b. Therefore S(a) 6= ∅.
Now, suppose |S(a)| > 1 implying that there are at least two points (v1, w1) and (v2, w2) in S(a).
Let vi = (y
i, πi1), w1 = (x
1, c, π12) and w2 = (x
2, d, π22). Clearly, (v1, w1) and (v2, w1) are feasible
points of LP k(c) and (v1, w1) ∈ OPT
k(c). Similarly, (v2, w2) and (v1, w2) are feasible points of
LP k(d) and (v2, w2) ∈ OPT
k(d). Therefore the following holds.∑k
l=1 cl(β
lT · y1)− π11 − π
1
2 ≥
∑k
l=1 cl(β
lT · y2)− π21 − π
1
2∑k
l=1 dl(β
lT · y2)− π21 − π
2
2 ≥
∑k
l=1 dl(β
lT · y1)− π11 − π
2
2
Using the fact that βl
T
· y = al − λl, ∀l ≤ k and the above equations, we get∑k
l=1 cl(al − cl) + dl(al − dl) ≥
∑k
l=1 cl(al − dl) + dl(al − cl)
⇒ −
∑k
l=1(cl − dl)
2 ≥ 0
⇒ ∀l ≤ k, cl = dl ⇒ c = d
⇒ ∀l ≤ k, βl
T
· y1 = βl
T
· y2
The above expressions and the fact that
∑k
l=1 λl(β
lT ·y)−π1−π2 evaluates to zero at both (v1, w1)
and (v2, w2) imply that π
1
1 = π
2
1 and π
1
2 = π
2
2 . Note that, S(a) ⊂ OPT
k(c).
Claim. The set {w ∈ Q′k | (v,w) ∈ OPT k(c), v ∈ P} is a singleton.
Proof. Suppose the set {w ∈ Q′k | (v,w) ∈ OPT k(c), v ∈ P} contains two distinct points w and
w′. In that case, λ takes value c on the 1-dimensional line L ⊂ Q′k containing both w and w′. Note
that the points corresponding to the end-points of L are on the lower dimensional face (< k) of
Q′k and both these points make separate convex sets of fully labeled pairs with the points of P .
Further the convex hull of these two convex sets is not contained by N k, however both these sets
are contained in OPT k(c) and OPT k(c) ⊂ Nk. It implies that OPT k(c) is not convex, which is a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
The above claim implies that w = w1 = w2. Now it is enough to show that v1 = v2 to prove
the lemma. In the extreme case, w is a vertex of Q′k and makes a fully-labeled pair with a k-
dimensional face of P . Let M(w) = {1, . . . ,m+n} \L(w). Clearly, |M(w)| ≥ n− k, M(w) ⊆ L(v1)
andM(w) ⊆ L(v2). Suppose v1 6= v2, then on the line joining v1 and v2, the following equations are
tight: βl · y = al − cl, ∀l ≤ k;
∑n
j=1 yj = 1 and all the equations corresponding to M(w). Clearly,
there are at least n + 1 equations tight on this line and they are not linearly independent. This
contradicts the fact that A and βls are generic. ⊓⊔
Motivated by Lemma A, we consider the function gk : N k → Rk such that,
gk((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) = (λ1 + (β
1T · y), . . . , λk + (β
kT · y)) (14)
The function gk is continuous and bijective (Lemma A), and the inverse gk
−1
: Rk → N k is also
continuous, since N k is a closed and connected set. Using gk and a function similar to (9), we
establish the homeomorphism between Γ k and EΓ k .
Theorem 20. The Nash equilibrium correspondence EΓ k is homeomorphic to the game space Γ
k.
Proof. Consider the function fk : EΓ k → Γ
k as follows:
fk(α, x, y) = (α′1, . . . , α′k), where α′l = (λl + (β
lT · y), αl2 − α
l
1, . . . , α
l
m − α
l
1)
T , ∀l ≤ k
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Claim. Function fk is bijective.
Proof. Consider an α′ = (α′1, . . . , α′k) ∈ Rmk. We construct a point (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ k such that
fk(α, x, y) = α′. Let ((y, π1), (x, λ, π2)) = g
k−1(α′11 , . . . , α
′k
1 ). Now we solve the following system of
equations to get α.
∀l ≤ k,
m∑
i=1
xiα
l
i = λl
∀l ≤ k, ∀i > 1, αli = α
′l
i − α
l
1
It is easy to see that we get a unique α by solving the above equations, and fk(α, x, y) = α′ holds.
⊓⊔
From the claim, it is clear that fk is a continuous bijective function. The inverse function fk
−1
:
Γ k → EΓ k is also continuous, since g
k−1 is continuous and the set EΓ k is closed and connected. ⊓⊔
Using the above theorem, next we give a fixed point formulation to solve a rank-k game.
Lemma 21. Finding a Nash equilibrium of a game G(γ) ∈ Γ k reduces to finding a fixed point of
a polynomially computable piece-wise linear function f : [0, 1]k → [0, 1]k.
Proof. Consider the hyper-planes Hl : λl−
∑m
i=1 γ
l
ixi = 0, ∀l ≤ k and the corresponding half spaces
H−l : λl−
∑m
i=1 γ
l
ixi ≤ 0, H
+
l : λl−
∑m
i=1 γ
l
ixi ≥ 0, ∀l ≤ k. A point u ∈ N
k corresponds to a NESP
of the game G(γ), iff ∀l ≤ k, u ∈ Hl. We know that for any a ∈ R
k, the points on N k with λ = a
are the optimal points of LP k(a), i.e., OPT k(a).
Let γmin = (γ
1
min, . . . , γ
k
min), where γ
l
min = mini∈S1 γ
l
i , ∀l ≤ k and γmax = (γ
1
max, . . . , γ
k
max),
where γlmax = maxi∈S1 γ
l
i, ∀l ≤ k. Consider the box B ∈ R
k such that B = {a ∈ Rk | γmin ≤ a ≤
γmax}
5. For the rank-1 case, B is an interval. We may obtain OPT k(γmin) and OPT
k(γmax) by solv-
ing LP k(γmin) and LP
k(γmax) respectively. Clearly, OPT
k(γmin) ∈
⋂
l≤kH
−
l and OPT
k(γmax) ∈⋂
l≤kH
+
l . It is easy to see that, all the a ∈ R
k such that N k intersects all the hyper-planes (Hl)
together at OPT k(a), lies in the box B.
The points corresponding to the Nash equilibria of the game G(γ) may also be modeled as the
fixed points of the function f : B → B such that,
f(a) = (
m∑
i=1
γ1i xi, . . . ,
m∑
i=1
γki xi), where (x, λ, π2) = {w ∈ Q
′k | (v,w) ∈ OPT k(a), v ∈ P}
For every a ∈ B, the corresponding x is well defined in the above expression (Proof of Lemma A),
and may be obtained in polynomial time by solving LP k(a). It is easy to see that the function f is
a piece-wise linear function. ⊓⊔
It seems that for a given a ∈ Rk, there is a way to trace the points in the intersection of N k
and λl = al, l 6= i, such that λi increases monotonically (analysis similar to Lemma 17). Using this
and the simple structure of N k, is there a way to locate a fixed point of f in polynomial time?
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we establish a homeomorphism between an m-dimensional affine subspace Γ of the
bimatrix game space and it’s Nash equilibrium correspondence EΓ , where Γ contains only rank-1
5 For any two vectors a, b ∈ Rn, by a ≤ b we mean ai ≤ bi, ∀i ≤ n.
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games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first structural result for a subspace of the bimatrix
game space. The homeomorphism maps that we derive are very different than the ones given by
Kohlberg and Mertens for the bimatrix game space [9] and it builds on the structure of EΓ . Further,
using this structural result we design two algorithms. The first algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium
of a rank-1 game in polynomial time. This settles an open question posed by Kannan and Theobald
[8] and Theobald [21]. The second algorithm enumerates all the Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game
and finds at least one Nash equilibrium of a general bimatrix game.
Further, we extend the above structural result by establishing a homeomorphism between km-
dimensional affine subspace Γ k and it’s Nash equilibrium correspondence EΓ k , where Γ
k contains
only rank-k games. We hope that this homeomorphism result will help in designing a polynomial
time algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium of a fixed rank game.
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A Regions in the Game Space
In this section, we analyze the structure of EΓ in detail. For every vertex v ∈ N
P , first we identify
a region in the game space and the points in EΓ corresponding to the region. Later we combine
them to get the complete structure of EΓ .
For a vertex v = (y, π1) of P , let R(v) = {α | (α, x, y) ∈ EΓ , for some (x, λ, π2) ∈ Ev} be it’s
region in the game space, i.e., the set of games with at least one NE corresponding to v. Clearly,
R(v) is non-empty only when v ∈ N P . For a w = (x, λ, π2) ∈ Ev, let Hw be the hyper-plane∑m
i=1 xiαi − λ = 0 in the game space. By α
′ ∈ Hw we mean Hw(α
′) = 0. Recall that for a game
G(α) ∈ Γ the row-player’s best response polytope is P (α) = P , and column-player’s best response
polytope is Q(α) which may be obtained by replacing λ by
∑m
i=1 αixi in Q
′ of (3).
Lemma 22. Let v = (y, π1) ∈ N
P be a vertex. α′ ∈ R(v) iff ∃w ∈ Ev such that Hw(α
′) = 0.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose α′ ∈ R(v)⇒ (α′, x′, y) ∈ EΓ for some u
′ = (x′, π2) ∈ Q(α
′). (α′, x′, y) ∈ EΓ ⇒
(v, u′) makes a fully-labeled pair of P (α′) × Q(α′). Let w′ = (x′, λ′, π2), where λ
′ =
∑m
i=1 α
′
ix
′
i.
Clearly, w′ ∈ Q′ and L(u′) = L(w′)⇒ w′ ∈ Ev, and Hw′(α
′) = 0.
(⇐) For a w = (x, λ, π2) ∈ Ev consider a point α
′ ∈ Hw. Clearly, the Q(α
′) of the game G(α′)
has a vertex (x, π2) with the same set of tight equations as w, and it makes fully-labeled vertex
pair with v. This makes (x, y) a NESP of G(α′)⇒ (α′, x, y) ∈ EΓ ⇒ α
′ ∈ R(v). ⊓⊔
Lemma 22 implies that R(v) =
⋃
∀w∈Ev
Hw. The following lemmas identify the boundary of R(v).
Lemma 23. Let (I, J) be the support-pair of v ∈ P with Ev 6= ∅.
1. If |I| = |J | ≥ 2, then R(v) is a union of two convex sets, and it is defined by only two hyper-
planes.
2. If |I| = |J | = 1, then R(v) is a convex-set. It has one defining hyper-plane if v is either vs or
ve, otherwise it has two parallel defining hyper-planes.
Proof. For the first part, let the bounding vertices of edge Ev ∈ N
Q′ be w1 and w2 (Lemma 6). Every
point w ∈ Ev may be written as a convex combination of w1 and w2. Therefore, the corresponding
hyper-plane Hw may be written as a convex combination of the hyper-planes Hw1 and Hw2 . This
implies that ∀w ∈ Ev, Hw1 ∩ Hw2 ⊂ Hw. Further, it is easy to see that the union of convex sets
{Hw1 ≥ 0, Hw2 ≤ 0} and {Hw1 ≤ 0, Hw2 ≥ 0} forms the region R(v) (Lemma 22), and hence the
hyper-plane Hw1 and Hw2 defines the boundary of R(v).
For the second part if v = vs or v = ve then the corresponding edge Ev ∈ N
Q′ has exactly one
vertex w1 (Lemma 6), and hence there is exactly one defining hyper-plane of R(v), namely Hw1 .
Moreover, for v = vs and v = vs the region R(v) is defined by Hw1 ≤ 0 and Hw1 ≥ 0 respectively.
If v 6= vs and v 6= ve, then the edge Ev has two bounding vertices w1 and w2, and x remains
constant on Ev (Lemma 6). Therefore, the hyper-planes Hw1 and Hw2 are parallel to each other.
Further, since any point w ∈ Ev may be written as a convex combination of w1 and w2, the hyper-
plane Hw lies between Hw1 and Hw2 . Hence, the hyper-planes Hw1 and Hw2 define the boundary
of the region R(v) (Lemma 22). ⊓⊔
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Lemma 23 shows that the regions are very simple and they are defined by at most two hyper-
planes. Moreover, if Hw1 and Hw2 are the two defining hyper-planes of R(v) then ∀w ∈ Ev, Hw1 ∩
Hw2 ⊂ Hw. Next, we discuss how the adjacency of v in N
P carries forward to the adjacency of the
regions through the corresponding defining hyper-planes.
Lemma 24. If the edges Ev and Ev′ share a common vertex w ∈ N
Q′, then the hyper-plane Hw = 0
forms a boundary of both R(v) and R(v′).
Proof. Lemma 23 establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the bounding vertices of Ev and
the defining hyper-planes of the region R(v). For every bounding vertex w of Ev, there is a defining
hyper-plane Hw of R(v) and vice-versa, and Hw ⊂ R(v). ⊓⊔
Clearly, R(v) and R(v′) are adjacent through a common defining hyper-plane Hw, where w =
Ev ∩ Ev′ is a vertex. Moreover, for every defining hyper-plane of R(v) there is a unique adjacent
region. Hence, every region has at most two adjacent regions and there are exactly two regions with
only one adjacent region (Lemmas 23 and 24). In short adjacency of vertices of N P carries forward
to the regions.
Let region graph be the graph, where for every non-empty region R(v) there is a node in the
graph, and two nodes are connected iff the corresponding regions are adjacent. Clearly, the degree
of every node in this graph is at most two and there are exactly two nodes with degree one. The
region graph consists of a path and a set of cycles, and it is isomorphic to N P where a vertex
v ∈ N P is mapped to the vertex R(v). Therefore, for every component of N , we get a component
of the region graph.
To identify a component of the region graph with a component of EΓ , first we distinguish the
part of EΓ related to R(v). For an α ∈ R(v), let S(α) = EΓ ∩{(α, x, y) | y ∈ ∆2 and (x, λ, π2) ∈ Ev}.
Let v = (y, π1) ∈ N
P be a vertex and w1, w2 = Ev ∈ N
Q′ . Let (x1, λ1, π
1
2) = w1, (x
2, λ2, π
2
2) = w2,
v1, v = Ew1 ∈ N
P and v, v2 = Ew2 ∈ N
P . We may easily deduce the following facts.
1. Let w′ = (x′, λ′, π′2) ∈ Ev be a non-vertex point and α
′ ∈ Hw′ \ (Hw1 ∩ Hw2), then S(α
′) =
{(α′, x′, y)}.
2. For α′ ∈ Hw1 \ Hw2 , S(α
′) = {(α′, x1, y′) | (y′, π′1) ∈ v1, v}. Similarly, for α
′ ∈ Hw2 \ Hw1 ,
S(α′) = {(α′, x2, y′) | (y′, π′1) ∈ v, v2}.
3. For α′ ∈ Hw1 ∩ Hw2 , S(α
′) = {(α′, x′, y′) | ((y′, π′1), (x
′, λ′, π′2)) ∈ (v1, v, w1) ∪ (v,w1, w2) ∪
(v, v2, w2)}. From Lemma 23, ∀w ∈ Ev, Hw1 ∩ Hw2 ⊂ Hw. Therefore the projection of edges
(v1, v, w1), (v,w1, w2), (v, v2, w2) on (y, π1, x, π2)-space is contained in P (α
′) × Q(α′) and all
the points on them are fully-labeled.
The above facts imply that (x, y) changes continuously inside the region (R(v)) as well as
on the boundary (Hw1 ,Hw2), and their values come from the corresponding adjacent edges of
N ((v1, v, w1), (v,w1, w2), (v, v2, w2)). Moreover, the consistency is maintained across the regions
through the NESPs of the games on the common defining hyper-plane.
All of these imply that there is a path between two points of EΓ iff the corresponding points
in N lie on the same component of N . Therefore EΓ does not form a single connected component
if N has more than one component. From the discussion in Section 2.2, we know that N contains
at least a path and may contain some cycles. Hence EΓ forms a single connected component iff N
contains only the path. Example 12 illustrates that EΓ is not connected in general by illustrating
a N with cycles.
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